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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge,  
Marie Curto wanted to swim with her family after 
work.  Steve Lusardi wanted to swim with his wife, who had 
disabilities after a series of strokes and needed pool therapy to 
recover.  But they lived at A Country Place, and its 
Condominium Association had adopted rules segregating use 
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of the communal pool by sex.  By 2016 over two-thirds of all 
swimming hours throughout the week were sex-segregated.  
After they were fined for violating this policy, Curto and the 
Lusardis sued, alleging violations of the federal Fair Housing 
Act (sometimes referred to as the “FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 
et seq., and New Jersey state law.   
The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
Condominium Association because, in its words, “the gender-
segregated schedule applies to men and women equally.”  
Curto v. A Country Place Condominium Assoc., 2018 WL 
638749, at *4 (D.N.J. 2018).  We disagree.  On the facts 
before us, the pool schedule discriminates against women in 
violation of the FHA.  We need not determine whether sex-
segregated swimming hours necessarily violate the FHA, or 
whether a sufficiently limited and more even-handed schedule 
might be justifiable, because the schedule actually adopted by 
the Condominium Association is plainly unequal in its 
allotment of favorable swimming times.  Thus we reverse. 
I. Background 
A Country Place Condominium Association, Inc. is a 
“55 and over” age-restricted condominium association 
located in Lakewood, New Jersey.  Lakewood has a large and 
growing Orthodox Jewish population, and so does A Country 
Place; by 2016, when the events in this litigation took place, 
approximately two-thirds of its residents were Orthodox. 
One of the amenities at A Country Place is its 
community pool, which reopened in 2011 after being closed 
for renovations.  It is maintained using funds from the $215 
monthly maintenance fee paid by each of the community 
residents.  After the pool reopened, the Condominium 
Association adopted rules for pool use creating certain hours 
when only members of a single sex were allowed to swim.  
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This was done to accommodate the Orthodox principle of 
tznius, or modesty, according to which it is improper for men 
and women to see each other in a state of undress—including 
bathing attire.  This principle—according to Fagye Engleman, 
the Association’s representative in this litigation—means that 
the Orthodox residents cannot comfortably swim at a time 
when members of the opposite sex might be present at the 
pool.   
Prior to 2016 the schedules provided for only a handful 
of sex-segregated swimming hours throughout the week, but 
as the Orthodox membership at A Country Place increased, 
the Association increased the number of sex-segregated 
hours.  Thus in 2016 the Association’s Board of Directors 
adopted a new schedule with greatly increased segregated 
swimming hours: 
 
Under this schedule, a total of 31.75 hours each week were 
defined as “men’s swim,” when women were prohibited from 
using the pool; 34.25 hours were defined as “women’s swim,” 
when men were prohibited.  Only 25 hours were open to 
people of all genders.  Excluding Saturday, which was left 
open for mixed-gender swimming because Orthodox 
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residents would not go swimming on the Jewish Sabbath, 
only 12 hours during the other six days of the week were 
available for integrated swimming.  Of note, a large majority 
of the hours in the evening were set aside for men, including 
the period from 6:45 p.m. onward every day of the week 
(except Saturday) and the entire period from 4:00 p.m. 
onward on Friday.  As for Friday afternoons, Engleman 
testified this was done because women are at home preparing 
for the Sabbath during that time.  
After the controversy with the plaintiffs began, the 
Association adopted a modified schedule: 
 
The only significant change was expanding the “adult 
residents only” period of “ladies’ swim.”  Only the 6:00 to 
6:45 p.m. period on Sunday, which went from “ladies’ swim” 
to “men’s swim,” was allocated to a different gender than 
under the initial 2016 schedule.  Thus this revised schedule 
provided for 56 hours of segregated hours (32.5 hours for 
men and 33.5 hours for women), along with the same 12 
hours of integrated swimming Sunday through Friday. 
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Plaintiff Marie Curto owns a unit at A Country Place,1 
and stated in the complaint that one of the reasons she chose 
to live there was to go swimming with her family.  Plaintiffs 
Steve and Diana Lusardi are a married couple who also own a 
unit in the residential facility.  They stated in the complaint 
that one reason they moved back to the residential facility 
(where they had lived previously) was to use the pool 
together.  Diana Lusardi suffered two strokes in 2013, which 
resulted in physical disabilities, and she wished to engage in 
pool therapy with her husband. 
On June 15, 2016, a resident at A Country Place 
notified the Board that Curto had been swimming during a 
men’s swim period.  The next day the Board held a meeting 
on the issue, at which Steve Lusardi read a statement 
explaining why he wanted to use the pool with his wife and 
challenging the pool schedule as discriminatory.  In the 
following weeks, the plaintiffs continued to use the pool in 
violation of the posted schedule and were fined $50 each by 
the Board.  The plaintiffs engaged in much back-and-forth 
with the Board about the validity of these fines, but to no 
avail.  They ultimately filed a complaint alleging violations of 
the Fair Housing Act as well as several New Jersey state laws 
regarding both discrimination and the rules for condominium 
associations.   
After discovery, both parties moved for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted the Condominium 
Association’s motion on the plaintiffs’ Fair Housing Act 
                                              
1 At least she owned a unit there when this lawsuit was filed.  
The same is true of the Lusardis.  It appears, though this is not 
contained in the record and does not affect the outcome of our 
case, that some or all of the plaintiffs have subsequently 
moved out of the condo facility. 
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claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the state law claims that remained.  The Court’s analysis of 
the FHA claim ran only two paragraphs and rested on its view 
that “the gender-segregated schedule applies to men and 
women equally.”  Curto v. A Country Place Condominium 
Assoc., 2018 WL 638749, at *4 (D.N.J. 2018).  This appeal 
followed. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  28 U.S.C. § 1291 gives us appellate jurisdiction. 
We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 
280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018).  Summary judgment is warranted if 
the moving party establishes “that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We view all facts 
“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and 
draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  
Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288. 
III. Analysis 
The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), makes it 
an unlawful housing practice to “discriminate against any 
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental 
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities 
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, 
or national origin.”  Per regulation, here 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.65(b)(4), this includes “[l]imiting the use of privileges, 
services or facilities associated with a dwelling because of 
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national 
origin of an owner, tenant or a person associated with him or 
her.”  The parties here do not dispute that the FHA applies to 
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the Condominium Association or that the communal pool is a 
“facility associated with a dwelling” within the meaning of 
the statute and regulation.2 
                                              
2 Although the Condominium Association’s pool use policy 
was motivated by the Orthodox Jewish residents’ religious 
beliefs, the Association did not mention the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
(“RFRA”), at any point in its filings in the District Court or in 
its merits brief before us.  (At our request, the parties 
discussed RFRA implications in supplemental memoranda.)  
Thus we determine that the Association has waived any 
possible RFRA defense to the plaintiffs’ FHA claim.   
 
Even had the Association asserted a RFRA defense, it 
would lack associational standing to assert the religious free 
exercise rights of its Orthodox Jewish members.  To have 
associational standing, (1) individual members must have 
standing in their own right, (2) the interest asserted must be 
germane to the purpose of the organization, and (3) neither 
the claim nor the relief requested must require the 
participation of the individual members in the lawsuit.  Hunt 
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com’n, 432 U.S. 333, 
343 (1977).  The first prong is easily met here, but the 
Condominium Association does not have a religious purpose.  
Moreover, religious beliefs are highly personal, and in a 
typical RFRA case the parties asserting a burden on their 
religion would provide personal testimony about their beliefs 
and the nature of the burden.  Here we have only the 
Association’s general assertions as to the beliefs of its 
Orthodox members. 
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“Where a regulation or policy facially discriminates on 
the basis of the protected trait, in certain circumstances it may 
constitute per se or explicit discrimination because the 
protected trait by definition plays a role in the decision-
making process.”  Community Services, Inc. v. Wind Gap 
Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  The Condominium 
Association argues that its pool schedule is not discriminatory 
because it was not motivated by malice toward either sex.  
But in Wind Gap we expressly held that a showing of malice 
is not required “where a plaintiff demonstrates that the 
challenged action involves disparate treatment through 
explicit facial discrimination. . . . Rather, the focus is on the 
explicit terms of the discrimination.”3  Id. (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted). 
Looking to the express terms of the pool policy, the 
Association emphasizes that it allows for roughly equal 
swimming time for both men and women in the aggregate.  
But this is not enough to save the pool schedule, which 
discriminates in its allotment of different times to men and 
women in addition to employing sex as its criterion.  Under 
the most recent version of the schedule, women are able to 
swim for only 3.5 hours after 5:00 p.m. on weeknights, 
                                              
3 This is different from when a plaintiff relies on indirect 
evidence of discrimination.  In those cases, a plaintiff must 
first make out a prima facie case of discrimination, which 
usually means showing circumstances supporting a plausible 
inference of discrimination.  Then the defendant must give a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, which the 
plaintiff may then show was a pretext for discrimination.  See 
generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802–04 (1973). 
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compared to 16.5 hours for men.  The schedule also assigns to 
men the entire period from 4:00 p.m. onward on Friday 
afternoons.  Women with regular-hour jobs thus have little 
access to the pool during the work week, and the schedule 
appears to reflect particular assumptions about the roles of 
men and women.  Cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
533 (1996) (Fourteenth Amendment forbids sex 
classifications based on “overbroad generalizations about the 
different talents, capacities, or preferences” of men and 
women); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982) (review of gender classifications 
must be “free of fixed notions concerning the roles and 
abilities” of men and women).  In light of these specific 
inequitable features, the schedule discriminates against 
women under the FHA even though it provides roughly equal 
aggregate swimming time to each gender.4 
                                              
4 Plaintiffs argue that any schedule of sex-segregated 
swimming hours would necessarily violate the FHA, and they 
see the Association’s arguments as akin to the “separate but 
equal” framework rejected in Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954).  We need not address that contention, 
and its potentially far-reaching implications, as this specific 
pool schedule is plainly discriminatory in its specifics.  Thus 
we also need not consider the Association’s argument that 
prohibiting single-sex swimming hours altogether would 
discriminate against the Orthodox Jewish residents and 
thereby itself violate the FHA.  Moreover, as Judge Fuentes 
notes in his concurrence, the Association fails to substantiate 
its claim that eliminating segregated swimming hours would 
have a discriminatory effect on the Orthodox residents at A 
Country Place, as we do not know how many of the Orthodox 
community use the pool or how many would not use a mixed-
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*     *    *    *    * 
In this context we reverse and remand the case to the 
District Court to enter summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs on their claim under the Fair Housing Act.  We 
leave to the Court whether it continues to decline the exercise 
of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims.  
                                                                                                     
sex pool because of religious objections.  See Concurring Op. 
at 4–5. 
  
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring.   
 For decades, our jurisprudence has denounced the very 
notion of “separate, but equal” policies.  In Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court recognized that “the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place” because separate facilities 
are “inherently unequal.”1  The Court was even more explicit 
in Loving v. Virginia:  “[W]e reject the notion that the mere 
‘equal application’ of a statute containing racial classifications 
is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s proscription of all invidious racial 
discriminations . . . .”2 
 
Our vehement disapproval of segregation does not 
weaken when we adjudicate sex discrimination rather than 
racial discrimination cases.  “Separate but equal treatment on 
the basis of sex is as self-contradictory as separate but equal on 
the basis of race.”3  In Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric 
Hospital, we explained that “[w]hen open and explicit use of 
gender is employed . . . the systemic discrimination is in effect 
‘admitted’ by the [defendant], and the case will turn on whether 
such overt disparate treatment is for some reason justified” 
under the relevant statute.4 
                                              
1 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
2 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967). 
3 N.L.R.B. v. Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 520 F.2d 
693, 695 (6th Cir. 1975). 
4 78 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1996).  Although Healey was an 
employment discrimination case, we frequently rely on our 
Title VII jurisprudence to guide our understanding of the 
FHA’s antidiscrimination provisions.  See Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. 
Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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While the majority opinion explains that we do not 
reach the issue of “whether sex-segregated swimming hours 
necessarily violate the FHA,”5 I write separately to express my 
skepticism that the pool’s sex-segregated schedule could be 
saved by a more even allocation of evening hours between men 
and women.  Our jurisprudence makes clear that facial 
discrimination does not become lawful merely because its 
burdens are felt by members of both sexes.  We would have no 
problem concluding, for example, that a pool schedule that 
allocates two-thirds of its hours to swimming segregated by 
race and one-third of its hours to “Integrated Swimming” 
would be intolerable under the FHA.  And the FHA’s 
prohibition on discrimination does not distinguish between 
discrimination on the basis of sex and discrimination on the 
basis of race.6 
 
We have never considered whether there may be 
exceptions to the FHA’s antidiscrimination provision.7  Our 
sister circuits that have considered the issue have determined 
that in certain circumstances, there may be legal justifications 
for facial discrimination under the FHA.  The Sixth, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits have concluded that facially discriminatory 
policies may be justified if a defendant can show that the 
                                              
5 Maj. Op. at 4. 
6 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (prohibiting discrimination “because of 
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”). 
7 Section 3607 creates a narrow exception by allowing 
religious organizations that sell or rent housing to give 
preference to members of the same religion, unless 
membership in the religion itself is “restricted on account of 
race, color, or national origin.”  See id. § 3607(a).  That 
exception is inapplicable here. 
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policies benefit the protected class or respond to legitimate 
safety concerns.8  The Eighth Circuit uses a different standard, 
requiring defendants to demonstrate that the facially 
discriminatory policy “was necessary to promote a 
governmental interest commensurate with the level of scrutiny 
afforded the class of people affected by the law under the equal 
protection clause.”9 
   
 There are two reasons why we need not now determine 
whether to adopt one of the tests put forth by our sister circuits.  
First, as the majority opinion rightly concludes, in this case 
there is evidence of both facial discrimination and disparate 
treatment.  The stark difference between men’s swimming 
hours and women’s swimming hours during weekday evenings 
                                              
8 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Larkin v. State of Mich. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 89 
F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1996); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 
46 F.3d 1491, 1503–04 (10th Cir. 1995).  As an example of 
how analysis of gender-based facial discrimination under the 
FHA might work, in Community House v. City of Boise, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that a religious homeless shelter’s 
policy of excluding women and families was facially 
discriminatory “because it explicitly treats women and families 
different from men.”  Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1045.  The 
court also addressed the shelter’s suggestion that it would 
create a separate shelter for women and families, casting doubt 
on that justification because “there is a serious question that 
sheltering women and families . . . separately from men would 
benefit women and families by satisfying a required safety 
need.”  Id. at 1052. 
9 Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 
93 (8th Cir. 1991). 
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is fatal to the pool schedule because it perpetuates stereotypes 
about the relative likelihood of men and women to be working 
during those hours.  The Condominium Association attempted 
to justify the disparity by pointing to the deposition testimony 
of Ms. Engleman, who stated that on Friday afternoons, 
women are home preparing for the Shabbat holiday.  The 
testimony is equivocal as to whether preparation for Shabbat is 
a religious mandate or a cultural practice that could be rooted 
in gender stereotypes about the role of women in homemaking.  
If it is the latter, of course, it cannot justify the discriminatory 
treatment of women.  “[G]eneralizations about ‘the way 
women are,’ [and] estimates of what is appropriate for most 
women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women . . . 
.”10  Even if Ms. Engleman were explaining a religious 
requirement, her reasoning cannot justify the disparity between 
men’s hours and women’s hours on Mondays through 
Thursdays. 
 
 Second, regardless of the test we adopted, the 
Condominium Association’s justifications would fail.  
Although the Association defends its discrimination on the 
basis of the religious concerns of its Orthodox Jewish 
members,11 it did not argue that its discriminatory schedule 
                                              
10 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996).   
11 The contemporaneous evidence suggests that the 
Association justified the pool schedule as the will of the 
majority rather than as a necessary accommodation to 
Orthodox Jewish residents.  The Association informed Ms. 
Curto that “[t]he vast majority of people would abolish any 
mixed swimming, because that is the will of the majority.”  J.A. 
174.  The Association also informed Mr. Lusardi that “we are 
well within our rights to serve the vast majority of the 
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was justified under any recognized exception to the FHA’s 
antidiscrimination provision.  Specifically, it did not assert that 
the association’s policies benefitted the affected protected class 
(here, women) or that they responded to legitimate safety 
concerns.12  It also waived any argument that its discrimination 
was protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  The 
Association instead argued that if it did not discriminate on the 
basis of sex, it would be discriminating against its Orthodox 
Jewish population because they would be unable to use the 
swimming pool due to religious modesty laws.  But there is no 
evidence in the record of the number of Orthodox Jewish 
residents who use the pool, and no evidence of the number of 
Orthodox Jewish pool users who would be unable to use a 
mixed-sex pool due to religious objections.13  At the very least, 
at the summary judgment stage, the Condominium Association 
was required to put forward more than speculation about the 
effects of integrating the swimming pool. 
 
In sum, I join the majority decision to reverse the 
decision of the District Court not only because of the pool 
schedule’s disparate treatment of women, but also because it is 
per se facially discriminatory in violation of the FHA. 
                                              
community . . . .  You are inconsiderate of the majority and 
wish for minority rule.  That is not our community.”  J.A. 176. 
12 See Cmty. House, Inc., 490 F.3d at 1050. 
13 In her deposition, Ms. Engleman said that all Orthodox Jews 
would oppose mixed swimming, but later admitted that some 
religious laws are open to different interpretations, like laws 
requiring men and women to remain separate in public spaces.   
